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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATE OF
PHYLLIS ROSANDER
LEIGH,
Deceased.

Case No. 8628

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
FARMERS MUTUAL AUTOM'OBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY

PRELIMINARY STA:TEMENT
This is an appeal from an order of the trial
court made on December 10, 1956, vacating and
setting aside an order appointing one David K.
Watkiss the administrator of the estate of Phyllis
Rosander Leigh, upon the grounds that the order
was void because there were no assets of decedent's
estate within the State of Utah. (Order in Record;
pages of Record are unnumbered.)
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with most of appellant's
Statement of Facts but controverts the assertion
that the wrecked automobile constituted an asset.
(Record, Paragraph II of the Petition for Appointment of Administrator.) Also, appellant's Statement of Facts should be supplemented by the following additional facts: At the time of her death
Leigh was a resident and domiciled in the State
of Minnesota. She carried a policy of public liability
insurance with the Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, a Wisconsin corporation, which
has never qualified and is not authorized to do
business in Utah. That after his appointment, suit
was filed in the Third Judicial District Court against
Watkiss as the administrator of the estate of Leigh
by Edward Rawlinkiewicz to recover personal injury damages claimed to have been sustained by
reason of the negligence of Leigh, and Watkiss,
purporting to act as administrator of the estate,
made demand upon respondent to defend the action,
claiming it was obligated to do so under the terms
of the insurance policy. That thereafter the insurance company applied to the court to have the appointment of Watkiss revoked upon the grounds
set forth in this petition. (Record.)
2
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STATEMENT OF POIN'TS
POINT I.
THE INSURANCE COMPANY HAD THE RIGHT
TO FILE THE PETITION TO REVOKE THE APPOINTMENT OF DAVID K. WATKISS AS ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE ESTATE OF PHYLLIS ROSANDER LEIGH.
POINT II.
THE CONTINGENT CLAIM AGAINST THE INSURANCE COMPANY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN
ASSET SUBJECT TO ADMINISTRATION IN UTAH.
POINT III.
UNDER ALL THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
THE APPOINTMENT OF WATKISS SHOULD BE REVOKED.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE INSURANCE COMPANY HAD THE RIGHT
TO FILE THE PETITION TO REVOKE THE APPOINTMENT OF DAVID K. WATKISS AS ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE ESTATE OF PHYLLIS ROSANDER LEIGH.

The first question requiring consideration is
whether the insurance company has the right to
file the Petition for Revocation of Letters of Administration issued to Watkiss.
Our statutes provide:

"Utah Code Annotated 1953, 75-1-8. Collateral attack prohibited: - An objection to any
paper, petition, decree or order in any probate
or guardianship matter, for an erroneous or
defective statement or determination of any
fact necessary to jurisdiction which actually
existed, or for an omission to find or state
3
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any such fact in such paper, petition, decree
or order, is available only on direct a pplication to the same court, or on appeal."
"Utah Code Annotated 1953, 75-14-14. Any
interested person has the right to be heard.
Any person shall have a right to be heard
by the court at any hearing on any question
affecting a probate or guardianship matter
in which he is interested."
These statutes should be sufficient in support
of the insurance company's right to file the petition.
Petitioner is certainly an "interested party" in having determined whether at the demand of Watkiss
it is obligated to defend the action, that is, whether
Watkiss was properly appointed so as to entitle him
to make the demand.
In the cases of In re Tasanen, 25 Utah 396, 71
P. 784 and In re Low ham's Estate, 30 Utah 436; 85
P. 445, there were petitions by the defendants to
revoke the letters of administration theretofore
granted by the court.
In Bancroft Probate Practice, Volume 2, Sec.
289, it is stated:
"Defective Appointment or Want of Jurisdiction.- To a certain extent, and whether
or not the order of appointment is 'void' in the
sense that it may be collaterally attacked,
a petition to rel·oke letters is regarded as an
alternative for an appeal from the order of
appo1~ntmcn t. Thus such a petition has been
resorted to as a mode of attack upon a finding
4
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of the court that the residence of the decedent
was in the county in which letters were issued,
and the attempt supported as a 'direct' attack.
As the New Mexico court observes, moreover, while the appointment of an administrator is a final judgment in the sense that it
is appealable, it is in no sense a finality so
far as the estate is concerned. If the court
were precluded from a reinvestigation of the
facts upon which letters were granted, the
veriest imposter might obtain letters and,
after the period for appeal has elapsed, remain securely in an office to which he has no
right, with no court having power to remove
him."
In the case of Louisville v. Herb, the court remarks:
"If he was not lawfully appointed, the
petitioner has the right to show that fact,
and thus defend itself from being harassed
by a suit brought without authority of law,
and from complications that may arise, should
his letters of administration be revoked, upon
the application of someone interested in the
estate of the decedent as a creditor, next of
kin, or otherwise. The right of a plaintiff
to man tain an action in the capacity he sues,
or to sue in a particular court or jurisdiction, may always be challenged by a defendant, although he may be liable for the wrong
sought to be redressed in a suit brought in
a proper court, by the proper party. This
proceeding is the only manner in which the
validity of letters of administration can be
called into question."
5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT II.
THE CONTINGENT CLAIM AGAINST THE INSURANCE COMPANY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN
ASSET SUBJECT TO ADMINISTRATION IN UTAH.

This question has been passed upon by anumber of courts. In some states it is held that a contingent claim against an insurance company is not
an asset of the insured's estate until the primary liability of the insured has been established by judgment against him. Furthermore, it is held that the
situs of any such claim is at the domicile of the insured and that it has no situs in a foreign state.
In Rogers v. Anderson (Kan.) 190 P. 2 857,
Rogers was a resident of North Carolina and never
had been in Marshall County, Kansas. Edwards was
a resident of Marshall County, Kansas and died
from injuries sustained in a collision with a car
driven by Rogers, operated within Saline County,
Kansas. Rogers was killed in the war and his will
probated in North Carolina. At the time of the collision , he had a policy issued by the American Indemnity Company. The probate court of Marshall
County, Kansas, appointed one Crouse as administrator of the Kansas estate of Rogers. The Kansas
statute provides:
"Proceedings for the probate of a will
or the administration shall be had in the county of the residence of the decedent at the time
of his death; if the decdent was not a resident
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of this state, proceedings may be had in any
county wherein he left any estate to be administered."
The opinion is very lengthy and the court discusses the question of what constitutes 'estate' and
also the situs of in tangible assets :
"Appellant, however, further asserts the
policy, under the admitted facts, cannot constitute a present asset of the insured's estate
anywhere. In support she cites our decisions
holding an insurer, under the terms of this
policy, is merely an indemnitor and as such
can only be subjected to judgment on the
policy after liability of the insured for damages has been finally determined. We have so
held. A few of the cases are Schoonover v.
Clark, 155 Kan. 835, 837, 130 P. 2 619; Lang
v. Underwriter's at Lloyd's, 157 Kan. 314,
319, 139 P. 2 414; Lechleitner v. Cummings,
160 Kan. 453, 458, 163 P. 2 423, and cases
therein cited. In other words, appellant states
that prior to the occurrance of the condition
precedent specified in the policy, the insured,
if living, would have no cause of action against
the insurer and a fortiori the policy does not
now constitute an asset of the insured's estate left in Kansas to be administered.
"Assuming for the moment the administrator was properly appointed and assuming
further that the situs of the policy was in
Kansas, this question persistently intrudeswhat estate did the policy contain or create
for the administrator to administer in Kansas? At this time and at any time prior to
judgment against the insured such adminis7
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trator could not draw to the estate any asset
provided by the policy. Assuming the administrator of the Edward's estate instituted an
action against the administrator of Rogers'
estate for the purpose of recovering damages
resulting from the automobile collision, garnishment proceedings against the insurer
would not lie prior to rendition of judgment
or agreement of liability ... "
After quoting other Kansas cases, the court
proceeds:
"In the Moore case, supra, this court said:
'The principal administration to which
all others are subordinate, is at the domicile
of the intestate, and the universally recognized rule of law is that the succession tq and
distribution of personal estate is governed
by the law of the place where the intestate
was domiciled at the time of his death.
''The original administrator, therefore,
with letters taken out at the place of the domicile, is invested with the title to all the personal property of the deceased, for the purpose of collecting the effects of the estate,
paying the debts, and making distribution of
the residue according to the law of the place
or directions of the will, as the case may be."
(Citations).
In the Modern Woodmen case, supra, this court
stated:
'The fact that the beneficiary certificate
sued on was in Douglas County was not of
itself sufficient to empower the probate court
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to appoint a guardian for the infants there.
The instrument created a simple contract
debt. The substantial property right adhered
to the debt, rather than to the instrument
evidencing it, and in legal estimation its situs
followed the domicile of the owner. In Moore,
Admx. v. Jordan, 36 Kan. 271, 13 P. 337, 59
Am. Rep. 550, it was held that a note and
mortgage belonging to a man dying in Colorado, with the instruments in his possession
there, were not assets in the hands of his
widow as administratrix, appointed in Colorado, but belonged to an administrator appointed at the decedent's domicile in Illinois;
and the doctrine is illustrated by numerous
decisions cited in the opinion. Under the same
principle, if the beneficiary certificate had its
situs at the domicile of the owners in Missouri, it could not have been assets in the
hands of a guardian appointed in Kansas, and
hence could not have been the foundation of
any order appointing such guardian.' Pages
137, 138 of 66 Kan., Page 281 of 71 P.
In the Miller case, supra, we find the following
'Was it the duty of the probate court to
appoint an administrator on the application
of a creditor of the decedent? Miller was a
nonresident of Kansas, and the question is,
Did he leave anything here on which to found
administration? It has been held that:
'Where a person dies intestate, who was
not a resident or inhabitant of the state at
the tilne of his death, and who left no estate
within the state to be administered, a probate court of the state has no jurisdiction to
issue letters of administration on the estate
9
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of such intestate, and, where letters are issued, the acts of the court in doing so are
utterly null and void.' ( Citations) ".
See also Olson v. Preferred Automobile Insurance Company, (Mich.) 244 NW 178.
In Wheat v. Fidelity and Casualty Company of
New York, (Colo.) 261 P. 2 493, the court made the
same ruling as in the Kansas case, that such a contingent claim did not constitute an asset and that
this was true even though the insurance company
which issued the policy was doing business in the
foreign state where it was claimed such contingent
claim existed as an asset. In said case Wheat, driving a car going south, attempted to pass another
car and collided headon with a car going north,
driven by Leonard Wheat (no relation). Both albert and Leonard ·were killed. Albert was a resident
of Georgia and Leonard of Missouri. Plaintiffs were
the surviving wife and minor daughter of Leonard
Wheat. Albert· carried liability insurance in defendant company. An administrator for his estate was
appointed in Georgia and his only tangible asset was
the damaged car which the administrator sold. Mrs.
Leonard Wheat applied for letters of adiministration in the estate of Albert in Colorado, and the petition was denied. She then filed another petition,
claiming to be a creditor of Albert, and one Delahay
was appointed and Mrs. Leonard vVheat then filed
10
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an action for damages against Delahay as administrator and he demanded of the insurance company
that it defend. The insurance company then moved
to vacate the order appointing Delahay on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction because Albert J. Wheat was
a non-resident of Colorado and left no property,
real or personal, therein. The motion was denied and
the insurance company secured certiorari and the
District Court quashed the appointment of the adlninistrator. On appeal, the court stated that the
question for determination was:
"The trial court found that at the time
of the appointment of Delahay as administrator, there was no property in Colorado,
tangible or in tangible, over which the county
court had any jurisdiction or control. As
hereinbefore stated, the wrecked automobile
was the· only tangible property in Colorado
at the time of the accident, and when the duly
appointed administrator of the estate of Albert J. Wheat in Georgia made disposition of
the automobile, the purchasers took and can
hold the same free from any lien of the claims
of creditors, because he was the duly appointed representative of the heirs of the estate,
and our statute so provides. As to the question
of the indemnity policy here involved constituting an asset of the estate, we believe the
following quotation from Rogers v. Edwards,
164 Kan. 492, 190 P. 2 857, 862, to be well
reasoned and in point :
'If the rights of the insured against the
insurer, under an ordinary indemnity policy,
11
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constitute assets of the nonresident insured's
estate, prior to the establishment of liability
of such estate to third persons, the situs of
such assets is at the domicile of the nonresident. The mere fact that a foreign insurance
company which issued the policy is also authorized to transact business in Kansas does
not change the situs of such asset, if it be an
asset prior to the establishment of the insured's liability, from the domicile of the nonresident to the state of Kansas.
'Of course, every state is, and should be,
anxious to protect and convenience its own
citizens so far as possible. No state is under
duty to permit assets of debtors to be placed
beyond the reach of its own creditors where
it can legally retain such assets. But in order
to retain them they must first exist here. To
hold the policy in question has its situs in
Kansas for purposes of administration would
be contrary to the principle repeatedly enunciated in our prior decisions. In view of our
firmly established and well understood doctrine, which we regard as sound, we do not
desire to confuse it. A conclusion that this indemnity policy constitutes 'estate' left by the
nonresident decedent to be administered in
Marshall County would mean this policy constitutes 'estate' which may be administered
in any county in Kansas and in any county
of every other state of the union, with a similar statute, in which the insurer is authorized
to transact business. We do not think the statute was intended to produce such a result.'
If this court follows the foregoing decisions,
then it is apparent that in this case there are no
1~
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assets of the estate of Mrs. Leigh in Utah. However, we do not wish to withhold from the court what
we have discovered with reference to the decisions
of some other courts on this question and therefore
call attention to cases of other jurisdictions which
hold that such a contingent claim which, according to some authorities, has its situs only at the
domicile of the creditor may, under certain circumstances, also constitute an asset where the debtor
resides. In other words, these cases hold that the situs
of the claim is not only at the insured's domicile but
where the claim may be enforced. It is so held in
Illinois under a statute which expressly provides
that choses in action are located where the debtor
resides, Furst against Brady, (Ill.) 31 NE2 606.
However, in the case at bar the insurance company,
if considered to be a debtor before judgment against
the insured, does not reside in Utah.
Also the following cases hold that such a contingent claim is an asset in a foreign state: Robinson v. John Dana's Estate, (N. Hampshire) 174
Atl. 772; Gordon v. Shea, (Mass.) 14 NE2 105; In
re Vilas Estate, (Ore.) 110 P. 2 940.
But in each of these cases the insurance company against which the claim was or was to be asserted, was doing business in the state where the
administrator of the insured's estate was appointed.
As stated in the Robinson-Dana case:
13
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"For the purpose of ownership, the creditor's domicile is generally regarded determinative of the fictional locality of the debt. But
since enforcement may be only where the
debtor or his property is found, the debt must
be owned by the creditor there as well as
owed by the debtor. VVhile as to ownership,
"debts can have no locality separate from the
parties to whom they are due" (Cleveland,
etc. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 300, 320,
21 L. ed. 179), in respect to enforcement, "It
is useless to say that a chose in action follows
the person of the creditor when the matter in
hand is the enforcement of payment by a suit
at law." 11 Harv. Law Rev. 101. "For the
purpose of collection a debt is always ambulatory, and accompanies the person of a debtor." 5 RCL 931."
In Gordon v. Shea the appointment of the administrator was approved because the insurance
company against which the contingent claim existed
was authorized to do business in Massachusetts, and
in the Vilas Estate case it was held:

"Executors and administrators. Where
insured under automobile liability policy, who
was resident of Washington was killed in
automobile collision in Oregon, in which occupant of other automobile was injured, and
insnrer under policy was at time of accident
and ever since such t1"me authorized to do
business in Oregon, liability of insurer on
policy was an "asset" of deceased motorist's
estate within meaning of statute, warranting
appointment of administrator in Oregon, so
that an action could be brought on claim of
liability arising out of accident."
1-1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

If this court follows the decisions of the courts
in Colorado, Kansas and Michigan it will hold that
the contingent claim against the Farmers Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company is not an asset in
Utah; first because its situs is in Minnesota, the
domicile of Mrs. Leigh, and second because it cannot
be an asset until after judgment against the insured.
If the court follows the New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Oregon cases it will likewise hold that
the contingent claim does not constitute an asset
in Utah of Mrs. Leigh's estate because the insurance
company is not doing business in Utah and therefore the claim cannot be enforced in Utah, the courts
having no jurisdiction over said company.
Let us now consider the last question to be
determined.
POINT III.
UNDER ALL THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
THE APPOINTMENT OF WATKISS SHOULD BE REVOKED.

Assuming that there are no assets of Mrs. Leigh
in Utah, did the court have jurisdiction to appoint
vVatkiss as administrator? If it had jurisdiction did
it abuse its discretion in making the appointment?
Our statute, Utah Code Annotated 1953, Sec. 75-1-2
provides:
15
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"Where wills proved, and letters granted. - Wills must be proved and letters testamentary or of administration granted:
(1) If the decedent was a resident of
the state, in the county in which he had his
residence at the time of his death.
(2)
If the decedent was a nonresiddent of the state: first, in the county in which
he may have died leaving estate therein; second, in any county in which any part of the
estate may be, the decedent not having left
estate in the county in which he died, or having died without the state.
( 3) In all other cases, in the county
where application for letters is first made."
In Re Tasanen's Estate, 25 Utah 396, 71 Pac.
984, the facts were that Tasanen, an employee in
Wyoming of the Diamond Coal and Coke Company,
met his death in Wyoming. The Coal and Coke Company was also doing business in Utah. An administrator of Tasanen's estate was appointed in Utah
on the basis of the cause of action existing against
the coal company. It will be noted that the claim
was not a contingent one as in the case we are considering but was one of direct liability, and furthermore it was one enforceable in Utah because the
coal and coke company was doing business in Utah.
In sustaining the lower court's refusal to set aside
the appointment of the Utah administrator, the
court stated that there was a conflict of authority
on the question whether a clain1 for death was an
16
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asset and it preferred the view that it was, but the
court held it was not required to follow either view
because under the last paragraph of Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 75-1-2:
"In all other cases, in the county where
application for letters is first made",
it was immaterial whether or not there were any
assets that :
"If there should be nothing which the administrator could legally do it could harm
nobody. If there should be something which
the administrator ought to do, then the appointment would be necessary".
There is implicit in this statement the conclusion that if there should be nothing the administrator could legally do, his appointment would be unnecessary. Furthermore, it was unnecessary for the
court to decide that an administrator might be appointed if there were no assets because in the Tasanen case there was an asset, to wit: A direct liability of the coal and coke company, a transitory right
which, having origin in Wyoming, could be sued on
in Utah where defendant was doing business. It
invoked the principle as laid down in Utah Savings
and Trust Company v. Diamond Coal and Coke Company, 26 Utah 299, 73 P. 524, to wit:

"Nature of Action-Enforcement-Suit
in Different State-Transitory: -. The right
of action for wrongful death provided by Re17
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vised Statutes Wyoming 1887, section 2364a,
and the following section, is not limited in its
enforcement to a trustee for the persons entitled to damages recovered therein, appointed
in that state, but the right of action is transitory in its nature, and may be maintained
in the courts of another State having jurisdiction of such matters, and having acquired
jurisdiction of the parties.''
The holding of the court in the Tasanen case
that an administrator may be appointed even though
there are no assets is purely dictum.
Coming back to the question of the appointment
of Watkiss and again assuming that there are no
assets of Mrs. Leigh's estate in Utah, we call attention to authorities which hold that the court is without jurisdiction to appoint an administrator if there
are no assets within the court's jurisdiction. As
state In re Dickerson's Estate, (Nev.) 268 P. 769
it is said:
"In California, under probate provisions
similar to ours, it is well settled that the ownership of property by the decedent is essential
to the granting of letters of administration of
his estate (Citations). Such also is the weight
of authority generally. But the citation of
authority from other jurisdictions is without
any useful purpose.
It is clearly within the expression of our
statutes that an estate is essential to a grant
of letters. The proofs adduced at the hearing
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showed no estate, legal or equitable, belonging to the estate sought to be administered.
Consequently there was nothing for the court
to act upon."
See also Olson v. Insurance Company, (Mich.)
244 NW 178; Wheat v. Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York, (Colo.) 261 P. 2 493.
However, even if technically the court has jurisdiction and it is so held in some jurisdictions, nevertheless it would not be abuse of discretion of the
court to refuse to make such an appointment. In
re Carter's Estate, (Okla.) 240 P. 727 as stated
by the court :
"It is clearly shown by the evidence that
the estate of the deceased, subject to the claims
of his creditors, amounted to nothing, and the
great weight of authority is to effect that,
where there is no other sufficient reason for
the appointment of an administrator, except
to take charge and administer the assets of
an estate, and there are no assets, then in that
event the refusal of the court to appoint an
administrator is within the discretion of the
court. And in this case we hold that the court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint an administrator."
If there should be a judgment against Watkiss
it would 'be worthless.
In Bancrofts Probate Practice, Vol. 2, Sec. 465
it is said:
"'There is no personal liability of an ex19
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ecutor or administrator as the result of judgments entered against him in his representative capacity".
Our statute, Section 75-9-15 provides:
''Judgment against personal representatives - Effect: - A judgment rendered
against an executor or administrator upon
any claim for money against the estate of his
testator or intestate only establishes the claim
in the same manner as if it had been allowed
by the executor or administrator and the
judge; and the judgment must be that the
executor or administrator pay in due course
of administration the amount ascertained to
be due. A certified transcript of the original
docket of the judgment must be filed among
the papers of the estate in court. No execution
shall issue upon such judgment, nor shall it
create any lien upon the property of the estate, or give to the judgment creditor any
priority of payment."

In Munton v. Bekins, (Cal.) 49 P. 2 338 the
court afifrms what our statute declares:
"The judgment is upon a claim against
the estate and while such a judgment, when
it becomes final, conclusively establishes the
validity of the claim for the amount of the
judgment, yet the judgment takes on the status
merely of an allo1red claim".
This statute of ours which fixes the status of
the judgment as an "allowed claim" really 1nakes it
a judgment against assets if there are any assets.
20
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In other words, as there is no personal liability of
the administrator, the judgment is one in rem.
No,v, there being no assets in Utah, the contingent claim against the insurance company having
no situs in Utah, and no primary liability of the
insured having been established and such contingent claim being in any event unenforceable in Utah,
any judgment Rawlinkiewicz might o b t a i n
would be worthless. Why should petitioner be
obliged to incur the expense of defending an action
against Watkiss? We can only assume that Ridgeway's counsel believes that such a judgment, though
not enforceable in Utah, would be entitled to full
faith and credit under the United States Constitution and could be sued on in a state where jurisdiction over the insurance company can be obtained.
This is a vain hope. In the first place it could not
possibly be res adjudicata because: (a) The judgment of the Utah court has not the effect of any ordinary judgment of the District Court for it has
only the status of an allowed claim to be satisfied
out of Utah assets, if any. (b) The Utah judgment
against the Utah administrator would not even be
evidence againce the insurance company, an entirely different party defendant, in a foreign state.
(c) The causes of action - that is, the cause of
action against Leigh's administrator in Utah and
a so-called cause of action upon such a judgment
21
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against the insurance company would be different,
and any such Utah judgment (if it can be called
a judgment) would not even be evidence in an action
against the insurance company in another state.
(d) Being merely a judgment in rem, such a judgment would have no extra-territorial effect.
A judgment in rem has no extra-territorial effect or efficiency beyond the state or jurisdiction of
the court which renders it. (31 Am. Jur. 104.)
A judgment against an administrator in one
state affords no basis for an action against an administrator of the estate of the same decedent in
another state (Braithwaite v. Harvey, (Mont.) 36
P. 38), and this is true even though the causes of
action were identically the same. (Ingersoll v. Coram, 127 F. 418.)
See note to 3 ALR 64.
If such a judgment could not affor~ a basis for
an action against an administrator of the same
decedent in another state it certainly could not form
the basis of an action against any third party in
such other state.
Finally, we inquire, why should \Vatkiss be
permitted to remain in office as administrator when
there are no Utah assets for him to administer;
when if he obtains a judgment in Utah it can neither
be satisfied here nor form the basis for an action in
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another state against the insurance company. The
trial court had a right, and we respectfully urge
that it had the duty, to terminate a proceeding which
is without foundation in fact or law. This is one
case where the court is authorized by statute to act.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 75-6-1 provides:
"Grounds for: The court may at any time
suspend any administrator, executor or guardian; and may, upon citation, revoke the letters of any administrator upon petition of a
competent person having a prior right thereto who had no opportunity to apply, or of
any administrator of the estate of a supposed
intestate whose will was subsequently found
and admitted to probate, or of any executor,
administrator or guardian for neglect, mismanagement, waste, embezzlement, incompetency or incapacity, or because of his conviction of an infamous crime, or for any other
reason deemed sufficient by the court."

Appellant's brief consists mostly of a discussion of matters which do not relate to the question
here involved. Counsel cites the Utah Survival
Statute giving a right of action for injury or death
against estate of a legal wrongdoer. He cites the
rule relating to the appointment of guardians for
infants and incompetent persons and refers to the
statute concerning service upon the Secretary of
State in an action against a nonresident motorist.
All these are extraneous matters. He argues that by
23
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accepting a premium the insurance company under
its policy, is obligated to defend a cause of action
arising out of the negligence of Mrs. Leigh in any
State in the United States, including, of course, the
State of Utah, but he seemingly does not understand
the position of the insurance company's objection,
which is, as previously stated, that since the insurance company cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts because it is not doing business in Utah, it would be unjust to compel it to
incur the expense of defending the case brought
against Watkiss when nothing whatever of benefit to the plaintiff would, or could be accomplished
by such action. Suppose the insurance company
should assume the defense of Watkiss and suppose
the plaintiff should secure a judgment, how could
the plaintiff be benefited? The judgment would
merely be against Utah assets of the Leigh estate,
and payable out of such assets in the ordinary course
of administration. (Sec. 75-9-15, Uwh Code Annow ted; Smith v. Hanson, 34 Ut. 171, 96 P. 1087.)
In N.ewton v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co., 88 Ut. 547,
40 P. 2d 204, it is said:
"Under the provisions of 102-9-15, R. S.
Utah 1933, a judgment rendered against an
executor or administrator upon a claim for
money against the estate represented by such
executor or administrator established the
claim in the same n1anner as if it had been
regularly allowed. The statute then further
24
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provides that the judgment must be that the
executor or administrator pay in due course
of administration, the amount ascertained to
be due. Further proceedings are then specifically provided for the collection and payment
of the claim. The judgment herein is a judgment against the executor in its official capacity only and could be paid only as provided
by the statute. As was said by the court in
the case of United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. Bleicher, 64 Ut. 49, 228 P. 188, after
quoting section 7659, Comp. Laws Utah 1917,
now 102-9-15, R. S. Utah 1933, supra:
"'The statute thus, in specific terms, determines the legal effect of the judgment
against an estate, and it further determines
that the allowance of a claim is in legal effect
precisely the same as a judgment; namely,
that in either case the only fact that is established is the amount of the claim and that it
must be paid in due course of administration.
And, in order to prevent all complications, the
statute further provides that no execution can
be issued on the judgment, that it creates no
lien upon any property and that the judgment
does not give a preference to any creditor."
A judgment against Watkiss would not only be
useless and ineffectual in Utah, it would be useless as a basis for an action in another State. Such
a judgment is not against the administrator personally, but only against assets in his hands. It affords
no basis for an action against the insurance company in another state because it has no extra-territorial effect being merely a judgment in rem. (31
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Am. Jr. 103-4; 34 C.J. 1174). It would not be entitled to full faith and credit under the United States
Constitution.
What would be the use of taking the time of
the court and causing the insurance company the
great expense of a trial under such conditions? It is
undisputed that there are no assets other than the
claim against the insurance company and as that
contingent claim is not enforceable in Utah, it is
not an asset in Utah and there are no assets out
of which such judgment could be paid. The cases
heretofore cited are to the effect that a contingent
claim against an insurance company is an asset
in a state foreign to the residence of the insured
and the only cases cited to the contrary are those
which hold that it is an asset in a foreign state, only
if the insurance company is doing business in such
foreign state. The contingent claim being no asset
in Utah, why permit the appointment of an administrator to stand when he has no assets to administer and why make it necessary for the insurance
company to defend hin1 when the plaintiff could
get nothing by its judgment in Utah or make any
claim against the insurance company by virtue of
such judgment either in Utah or any other state?
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CONCLUSION
1. The court appointed Watkiss administrator only on the theory that the contingent claim
against the insurance company is an asset in Utah
of the Leigh estate (see petition for appointment
of administrator in Record.) We believe it .is not
such an asset.
2. As any judgment obtained by Watkiss
would merely occupy the status of an allowed claim
against the Leigh estate in Utah and payable out of
Utah assets in the regular course of administration
and as there can be no resort to the insurance company to satisfy the judgment and as there is no other
property out of which that judgment could be satisfied, it was error to appoint Watkiss 'because there
was nothing for him to do.
3. The appointment of Watkiss was a useless
proceeding and the court under Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Sec. 75-6-1, had authority to revoke his
letter. This the court should do when, if judgment
goes in his favor, plaintiff can gain nothing. The insurance company should not be put to the expense of
defending a case which, in any event, would result
only in a worthless judgment.
It is respectfully submitted that this Court
should affirm the order of the trial court revoking
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the appointment of David K. Watkiss as the Administrator of the Estate of Phyllis Rosander Leigh.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN

Attorneys for Respondent.
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